This article explores promotions, anonymity and rewards as techniques of governance in Canadian Crime Stoppers (CS) programmes by analysing texts and personal interviews. The function of CS Crime of the Week advertisements is found to be more a practical effort to reduce loss along property lines through offering rewards and anonymity and less a tactical effort to solve mostly violent crimes or a symbolic endeavour consistent with the promotion of 'law and order' ideology. Through new partnerships with CS, various partners including private insurance gain symbolic but also practical risk management benefits. Anonymization promises to reduce risk to 'tipsters' and moral risk to police and partners. A graduated system of rewards seeks to manage risk while encouraging risk among 'tipsters' and is linked to moral imaginings of the tipster as 'good citizen' and 'criminal'. Risk and morality are therefore linked in this context. These techniques of governance are deployed together to render the policing of property and moral risks possible as these techniques are themselves governed. CS does not simply aid law enforcement. Rather, in CS law is at once a way in which these techniques are governed and a barrier to their deployment. These findings have implications for the sociology of governance and law and move beyond previous research on CS.
INTRODUCTION
A NONYMITY was once thought to be an inevitable feature of modernity. But in today's media-saturated societies anonymity has to be manufactured and governed. This is especially true if it is to become useful as a technique of governance. Offering rewards to promote specific conduct among subjects is also a potentially useful technique. But it is likewise difficult to accomplish. One has to decide how much and what kind of reward will compel subjects to act in desired ways. This obviously requires some knowledge of subjects. But if subjects are rendered anonymous, how can they be known? And to achieve the preferred outcome among the governed, those who govern must promote offers of anonymity and rewards and the preferred conduct in the first place. It would seem that governing through these means would not be easy to accomplish alone. These are obstacles that contemporary Crime Stoppers (CS) crime prevention programmes have sought to overcome.
Recent sociology of governance or 'governmentality' studies, including research on law as governance, have explored the character of 'government at a distance' and risk management in the context of law enforcement and crime control (O'Malley, 1992 (O'Malley, , 1997 Hermer and Hunt, 1996; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; de Lint, 2000) , and various other domestic (Simon, 1994; Dean, 1995; Lippert, 1998) and international domains (Dillon, 1995; Lippert, 1999) . As a consequence, this varied literature has lent considerable insight into new arrangements of rule referred to as 'advanced' liberalism (Rose, 1996) . Yet some key techniques of such rule remain neglected or underinvestigated. As well, what is at times absent in these studies is recognition that techniques and the dominant relation of 'advanced' liberalism, the 'partnership ' (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996; Crawford, 1997; Lippert, 1998) , that make such rule possible, are not self-evident but are themselves governed as they are deployed. Finally, it is only recently that research in this area has begun to explore the notion that a preoccupation with risk management in ways consistent with advanced liberalism does not eliminate moral discourse. Rather, risk and morality are intimately intertwined (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 123; Ericson et al., 2000; Baker, 2000) . To lend further insight into these omissions and issues, this article seeks to explore promotions, anonymity and rewards as techniques of governance, how they relate to one another and to the 'partnership' relationship, and how they permit governance along risk management lines as they are themselves governed in the context of CS. In doing so, this article also seeks to shed light on the development and workings of CS, an increasingly prevalent programme, and to move beyond previous CS research.
The dominant image of CS is a programmatic arrangement among police, media and the community that imagines citizens anonymously calling in tips in response to unsolved crimes advertised in media as Crimes of the Week. A coordinator distributes these tips to police investigators with the explicit purpose of solving the crime. If a tip leads to any arrest or seizure of property 476
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seeking out regional or federal partnerships on behalf of local programmes. Each region's board has a representative who is designated to dialogue with the international body, CS International (Crime Stoppers, 1996: 4) , which is headed by an elected president (Crime Stoppers, 2001b: 104) . Each local CS programme is also encouraged to establish itself as a non-profit organization with charity status and is foreseen organizing promotions and partnerships, receipt and distribution of tips, and determination and granting of rewards through a volunteer board of directors drawn from the local community, as well as through coordinators. The ideal CS coordinators are to be experienced investigators drawn from the local police service and are to possess 'outgoing personalities, impeccable personal reputations and a great deal of selfmotivation' (Crime Stoppers, 1983 : IV-3, cf. 2001a : 10, 2001c 3). If they are willing to 'work 60 hours per week and be on call 24 hours a day', the 'rewards are many' and 'every day can be a new adventure ' (Crime Stoppers, 1983: IV-4) . Consistent with other components of CS discussed later, one might note that this characterization fits the ideal subject of advanced liberalism, the bold, self-motivated, enterprising entity in tireless pursuit of specific goals (stopping crime) in return for rewards (adventure) (cf. Rose, 1992) . For this study one CS region comprising at least 10 programmes was examined. 1 To obtain a sense of how CS has developed and works, CS websites, major newspaper and popular periodical articles pertaining to CS, legal decisions pertaining to CS, several recent CS press releases, newsletters, advertising pamphlets and a training video, the first (Crime Stoppers, 1983) , the most recent (Crime Stoppers, 2001a , 2001c and 'Safe School' (Crime Stoppers, 1996) CS International operations manuals, and publicly available charitable status returns for 10 CS programmes in the region, and one for the CS regional board, were collected and analysed. Websites and periodicals of CS regional or federal partners or industries they represent were also examined for information about CS. To study a major product of CS programmes, Crime of the Week promotions, available local CS programme websites in the region were first examined. 2 Those displaying at least half a year (i.e. more than 26 weeks) of Crimes of the Week in their archives were selected during March and April 2001. This generated 640 Crimes of the Week from 10 CS programmes. Their content was then analysed by major offence type represented and type of discourse deployed. Finally, 10 openfocused personal interviews of about one hour in duration were conducted with: four CS coordinators from four local programmes from within, and one coordinator from a programme outside the region; two representatives of major regional partners; and one board member from each of a local and regional, as well as the international level of CS.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON CS
CS has been studied previously. A national evaluation conducted in the USA in the 1980s yielded some published works (Rosenbaum et al., 1989; Lavrakas 478 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 11(4) et al., 1990) . As well, smaller-scale studies of CS or equivalent programmes have been carried out (Carriere, 1986 (Carriere, , 1987 Parent, 1993; McCormick, 1995; Galanopoulos, 1999) . The most theoretically informed and widely distributed account to date (Snider, 1990; Sperling, 1992) , however, is Carriere and Ericson's (1989) Canadian case study of CS. Instead of merely measuring CS' effectiveness, Carriere and Ericson (1989) examine its emergence, workings and wider effects. Situating it in the context of the ascendancy of community policing, the authors (1989: 21) argue that the rise of CS has to do with converging interests of several institutions: police, corporate sponsors and mass media (1989: 96) . In CS, police garner symbolic legitimacy and become better able to extract information from and about the community in the form of tips (1989: 22) . Through sponsoring CS, private corporations can enhance their public image by associating themselves with the virtuous goal of fighting street crime alongside police (1989: 96) . Mass media outlets benefit similarly. Whether print, television or radio, each is also provided with a reliable source of entertaining crimerelated stories for its market in the form of a major product of the police-media nexus in CS: the Crime of the Week (1989: 98) . Significantly, Carriere and Ericson (1989: 54) identify a 'media logic' that is brought to bear on selection of Crimes of the Week. Television outlets, for example, to justify donating airtime to CS, require that these stories have entertainment value. As a result, only certain types of crime are selected for broadcast by the CS coordinator and their narrative is at times shaped with input from media personnel (1989: 49). As well, fitting this 'media logic', Carriere and Ericson (1989: 47-79) argue that an affective discourse comes to be present in Crimes of the Week narratives, one that seeks to invoke emotional response to the criminal acts described, and which is clearly not intended solely to provide details to facilitate identification and eventual apprehension of perpetrators. Crime of the Week content is intensively policed consistent with these arrangements. The resulting picture of crime painted by Crimes of the Week, Carriere and Ericson (1989: 79) argue, is one of violent street criminals victimizing citizens in public spaces (cf. McCormick, 1995: 161) . In this way the Crime of the Week promotes 'law and order' criminal control strategies premised on deterrence and incapacitation (Carriere and Ericson, 1989: 77, 106) . In focusing on issues relevant to the varied literature on governance and risk, the current study complements and updates but ultimately moves beyond the approach and findings of Carriere and Ericson (1989) . First, Crime of the Week advertisements are (re)considered. Their function is found to be more a practical, promotional effort to reduce loss along property lines through offering rewards under cover of anonymity, and less a tactical effort to solve specific crimes, or a symbolic endeavour consistent with promotion of 'law and order' ideology. Through CS promotions and special reward arrangements, new partners stand not only to gain symbolic benefits but also to satisfy their practical institutional requirements to manage risk to property. Dominant among and illustrative of new CS partners is private LIPPERT: CRIME STOPPERS REVISITED 479
insurance. Tips about insurance fraud and a broader reduction of property loss are sought through its links with CS. Anonymization and offering rewards as governmental techniques as well as related moral imaginings of the tipster are then discussed in turn. Anonymization in CS seeks to reduce risk to tipsters posed by gathering information about criminal activities while also decreasing the possibility for moral spoilage of police associated with a reliance on transactions with the criminal element to obtain such information. Recognizing the centrality of anonymity sheds light on the relationship between CS and law. Doing so suggests that CS not only aids enforcement of law, but is governed through law and encounters law as a barrier to its growth in some directions. In CS, anonymization also creates uncertainty about the identity of tipsters, but some forms of identity knowledge about the 'tipster' that permit determination of appropriate rewards to manage risk are still capable of being produced. Consonant with these arrangements a formal risk technology is now used in some CS programmes to determine reward levels: rewards are to vary by type and seriousness of offence and increasingly by the institutional priorities of partners, but also by the level of tipster risk-taking and potential to become repeat tipsters. While monetary rewards are calculated and offered for all tips that prove useful, moral rewards that take the form of relaying specific information to the 'good citizen' tipster about tip outcomes are also recognized within CS. Reward determination therefore entails risk management and moral categorization: discursively connected to the determinations are moral imaginings of the tipster. Promotions, partnerships, anonymization and rewards are interrelated and themselves governed as they make the management of mostly property and moral risks consistent with advanced liberalism possible.
CS PROMOTIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS
The offer of anonymity and rewards in CS has to be promoted, as do the means of reporting particular kinds of risky people or situations. A coordinator interviewed for this study describes the recent expansion of such CS promotional efforts:
. . . every officer who has business cards in this department from now on when you flip over the card on the back there's a Crime Stoppers' logo and the 1-800 number. So now you'll be going to crime scenes, you're handing this out to particular witnesses. . . . We got a local trucking company with a 53-foot trailer to put our logo down the side with the 1-800 number on it . (Hermer and Hunt, 1996: 468) : police hand out CS business cards at crime scenes that will then be transported into private domains by otherwise fearful witnesses; trucks, buses as well as donated CS vans move across the urban landscape with CS messages that suddenly appear 'in your face' in traffic; and through cable, between trivia games CS messages are carried into the dark confines of licensed drinking establishments. As such, these promotions are undoubtedly effective in finding their way into new domains previously untouched by CS. 3 However, despite these and a wide variety of other recent efforts, CS promotion of anonymity, rewards, and the reporting of certain kinds of crime continues to be attempted primarily through the even more mobile vehicle of Crime of the Week advertisements appearing in many local programmes in four media formats: television, radio, newspaper and Internet. CS coordinators select and transform criminal acts through written narrative into these Crimes of the Week, yet they admit during interviews that some weeks offer no significant events that can conceivably become such. Earlier events are then often used. Indeed, for situations when no major crime is readily available the CS Manual encourages this practice, even if 'committed five or ten years ago ' (Crime Stoppers, 2001c: 3.13) . Consistent with Carriere and Ericson's (1989: 60) findings, in these situations 'generics' promoting one type of crime rather than a specific act are also at times used. According to interviewees, Crime of the Week television reenactments, in some programmes in the region, are filmed during one day a month, up to three at a time, and then spread out in weekly succession over the course of the subsequent month. Similarly, an event drawn from, for example, an urban area with the purview of a particular programme becomes a Crime of the Week for the entire jurisdiction, thereby suggesting relevance to both urban and rural areas. In these ways, Crime of the Week discourse constitutes crime as a continuous and spatially immediate danger that demands an active, ongoing community response rather than as a sporadic distant problem easily eradicated by police reaction alone. Its central message is that significant crimes are occurring in your community every week, the one advertised is but one of many, and your assistance in providing tips is required to do something about it or others like it. Crimes of the Week are usually accompanied by offers of reward and anonymity.
The result of the analysis of Crimes of the Week is shown in Table 1 . Consistent with Carriere and Ericson's (1989) findings, several types of crime are absent. White-collar crimes and crimes by police are simply not present. As well, only one of the 640 Crimes of the Week refers to domestic violence that mostly affects women. Carriere and Ericson (1989: 52) noted that 'a corporate crime has never been advertised as a Crime of the Week'. There is LIPPERT: CRIME STOPPERS REVISITED 481 not a single instance of such a crime among the 640 advertisements either. While markers of affective discourse are present, they are evident in only 196 (30 percent) of the 640 Crimes of the Week examined. Carriere and Ericson (1989: 56) found that the vast majority of Crimes of the Week (81 percent) contained a violent component. However, of the 640 advertisements here, only 137 (21 percent) elicit such a character. There is some variation across the 10 CS programmes with some depicting more violent crimes than others. Yet the majority of Crimes of the Week in only two of 10 programmes are mostly violent. 4 And most violent Crimes of the Week displayed in these two programmes were robberies of businesses (usually automobile service stations, convenience stores and banks), thus also involving property loss. Indeed, across CS programmes the vast majority of Crimes of the Week (89 percent) including those with a violent component describe property loss, mostly to businesses and citizens' residences, and to a lesser extent to non-profit organizations and public bodies. Though not explicitly stated in their study, when Carriere and Ericson's (1989: 53) results are revisited, they too reveal that most (62 percent) Crimes of the Week referred to property loss, with or without a violent component. The important finding to note here is not so much that most Crimes of the Week from across the region are non-violent, but that they are mostly about property loss. It is my contention that this is consistent with a broader promotional emphasis on risk of property loss, which fits in turn the more practical and less symbolic requirements of new CS partners other than media and police. The primary aim of the Crime of the Week is promotion (Carriere and Ericson, 1989: 49) , specifically of anonymity, rewards, and the means of reporting particular types of crime, rather than to generate tips about specific unsolved crimes. CS coordinators claimed in interviews that less than 10 percent of Crimes of the Week are solved as a result of tips. Remarkably, in previous research, CS coordinators similarly estimated in interviews that 'well under 10 percent' (Carriere and Ericson, 1989: 103) and '15 percent' (Carriere, 1987: 112) of advertised crimes were cleared in this manner. Yet this consistently low clearance rate has not curtailed the use of the Crime of the Week in CS, suggesting that their primary purpose is not tactical. Indeed, within CS the measure of effectiveness is not the clearance rate at all. Nor is it a reduction of crime rates compared to a control. Instead, according to interviewees and CS websites, only the measure of the absolute and usually cumulative number of arrests or value of property or drugs recovered as a result of tips is tracked. This measure is impressive on the surface and undoubtedly for this reason is prominently displayed on CS websites and in other CS promotions. It is, however, a dubious indicator of effectiveness (see Carriere and Ericson, 1989) . The promotional emphasis of Crimes of the Week is also consistent with the fact of the presence of 'generics' and common inclusion of the phrase 'information on this or any crime' immediately following the narrative. These advertisements are designed therefore more to promote tips about particular types of (mostly property) crime likely to occur in the future and the proper pathways (i.e. anonymized telephone calls) and potential payoffs (i.e. rewards) of doing so, and less to secure tips about specific unsolved crimes of the past.
CS is about identifying and managing risk. This emphasis is evident, for example, in the CS Manual:
Crime Stoppers . . . creates a universally recognizable system, whereby crime detection and prevention occur by people reporting criminal activity without detection by the criminals, allowing for a constant patrolling of communities by everyone who lives there. Crime Stoppers also prevents crime by making communities aware of the types of crimes occurring in their area, so that they can better protect themselves from those crimes, and recognize when crimes are occurring. (Crime Stoppers, 2001a: 4, emphasis added) The focus on 'making communities aware' to allow them to 'better protect themselves', differs markedly from the function of directly deterring through (swift and certain) prosecution leading to (severe) punishment or incapacitation that Carriere and Ericson (1989: 12, 77) assign to CS. Indeed, interviewees associated with CS and CS texts rarely refer to deterrence as an aim of CS. Like Crimes of the Week, tips called into CS do not always refer, at the time of the call, to specific unsolved criminal acts of the past either. Rather, many tips are oriented to the future. Interviewees related that tips LIPPERT: CRIME STOPPERS REVISITED 483 lead to, for example, future police stings, or alerting the public about a type of crime in a particular neighbourhood and instructing them on how to protect themselves consistent with risk management. A coordinator related:
We had . . . just a terrific amount of Break and Enters. So we ran a generic Break and Enter [Crime of the Week], one saying how they were doing it. They were . . . forcing the garage door, driving in, pulling the garage door down, loading up the trucks. So we ran that as something to watch out for. (Interview 4) Much information regularly received as tips as a result of a promotion concerns persons and situations thought to pose a risk of some kind. This attention to risk is being carried out more and more on behalf of CS partners. Sponsors have provided free advertising for promotions or contributed to the general reward funds since the inception of CS. Interviewees and CS websites reveal each CS programme in the region to have different sponsors, undoubtedly a result of boards seeking out and securing funding support at the local level. But a significant development in CS in the 1990s has been the addition of specific regional and federal 'partnerships'. As one CS coordinator related the current situation:
. . . we have agreements with the banking association, some insurance, other corporations, with regards to whether it's a re-imbursement of rewards, or it could be a partnership for promotion of the Crime Stoppers name, like the . . . trucking association . . . the idea being that you want to try and form these partnerships to promote Crime Stoppers, make it more effective, or to help in the financing of it. (Interview 3)
As Carriere and Ericson (1989) observed, private corporations seek to benefit in a symbolic way from publicly aligning with CS. Consistent with this, the existence of a given partnership tends to be promoted by a given partner as well as CS. For example, seven of the eight partner websites examined (see Table 2 ) advertise the fact of their CS partnership. The newer partnership ideal, however, foresees mostly private entities entering into more intimate, well-defined arrangements with CS at a regional or federal level that promise to yield more practical and less symbolic payoffs for both parties. In most instances, these take the form of reward reimbursements for a tip that signals reduction of specific kinds of offences that represent a risk to the partner.
These partnerships lend insight into the content of Crimes of the Week. Carriere and Ericson (1989: 55) note that 'considerable influence is exerted by both media logic and the necessity of corporate sponsorship. . .'. While the 'media logic' is significant, previously unacknowledged practical requirements of partners to manage risk of property loss through CS also undoubtedly contribute to the types of crime selected or reshaped as Crimes of the Week. CS has no regional or federal partnerships that would encourage featuring the types presently absent in the Crime of the Week. For example, regarding the absence of corporate crime, it may well be that corporate partners would not approve of featuring such crimes as Crimes of the Week 484 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 11(4) (Carriere and Ericson, 1989: 55) . Yet given the way CS is currently organized, another factor is undoubtedly an absence of regulatory agencies or consumer groups that normally police corporate crime currently serving as CS regional or federal partners and therefore seeking from CS, promotion of LIPPERT: CRIME STOPPERS REVISITED 485 their type of crime to generate tips and reduce risk. This is true of other types of crime that are absent. There are, for example, no civil liberty organizations (crimes by police) that presently serve as CS partners. There was a recent effort in one Canadian region to promote tips about domestic violence that entailed a CS partnership with a government department that targets women's issues, but it was short-lived (Botchford, 1999; Zmijewski and Norris, 1999) . Interviewees related most CS tips referred to drug offences. It may be that such tips simply do not require much promotion due to the prevalence of such offences. There is also apparently no current private or other partner that would be willing to reward CS to promote such offences specifically. Finally, drug offences are often seen as 'victimless' and therefore perhaps not entertaining enough for Crimes of the Week. To be sure, however, there is a tension between the 'media logic' and requirements of partners to manage risk in CS in some instances. The latter effort would benefit from increased promotion of types (e.g. cargo loss for the trucking association) that would not lend themselves to easy transformation into entertaining Crimes of the Week.
Not just any organization can partner with CS to police risk. The partnership relation is itself policed. Consistent with how anonymization is deployed in CS to protect moral integrity of police, as discussed later, potential CS partners are screened for moral risks. As a local board member noted in an interview:
if we do get a corporate sponsor we're going to definitely want to know that they have no criminal activity . . . in their record so . . . we're going to find out who their principals are and we're going to get some information . . . on the company and we're going to run that background to make sure that [ In one instance, the capacity to protect tips is claimed by a coordinator to have been a criterion for a local partnership:
The Humane Society is not contributing anything financially . . . But we wanted to set up the protocol so that when we sent the inspector the information we knew . . . it wasn't sitting around on a desk, that you have control of the document. Sometimes it's a partnership that way as well. [So it's not just to . . .] Reimburse our funds? No because without it we would still take those tips and deal with those crimes even if there was no agency that would . . . reimburse you. Those are nice . . . but that's not the sole purpose of those partnerships. (Interview 6) One can partner with CS for practical purposes only if one possesses the proper monetary or moral pedigree, the latter of which includes a capacity to maintain anonymity of tipsters. The 'responsibilization' of these new partners, so typical of advanced liberal arrangements that entail scaling back the state (in this case the public police) and taking on new partners to pursue specific risk management goals, is accompanied by moral discourse.
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Dominant among the present partnerships and reflective of a broad emphasis in CS on risk management is private insurance. A condition of possibility for the growth of CS in the 1990s has been the 'problematization' (Castel, 1994) of fraud within this industry (see Ericson et al., 2000) . One recommendation of the Canadian Task Force on Insurance Fraud in June 1993 was to 'specifically explore closer links to the Crime Stoppers organization' (Laycock and Collins, 1994: 17) . As a consequence, in 1995 CS entered into a full partnership with the Canadian Coalition against Insurance Fraud (CCIF) in the region (CCIF, 2000: 8) . This partnership extends to the local levels of CS. According to an examination of CS websites and 2000-1 charitable status returns of programmes in the region, local insurance companies often sponsor local CS programmes. As a regional partner representative related:
Yeah, that really takes place at the local level. I'm talking small towns. Perhaps [name of town in region] Crime Stoppers unit would contact maybe the local mutual insurance company, and one of my promises to Crime Stoppers in the future would be that I would send out a letter to the CEOs to pass along . . . to their local branches to tell them that if Crime Stoppers comes knocking on their door, they should consider participating. (Interview 10) According to interviewees, insurance representatives also sit on local CS boards of programmes within the region. The charitable status returns from 2000-1 containing complete information reveal that four of seven programmes had at least one insurance industry representative on their board (cf. Carriere and Ericson, 1989: 20) . This presence is evident in other regions as well. A coordinator from outside the region related:
when we did the [CS] international conference, the insurance companies themselves donated probably ten thousand dollars. . . . The baseball cards are sponsored by an insurance company . . . when we do our magazine, there will probably be some big insurance company heads in there. (Interview 5) A large insurance company helped fund the partnership (see Table 2 ) between the [city in region] Construction Association and CS established in 1999 as well (Walls, 1999) . Construction sites tend to be insured against the risk of heavy construction equipment loss. In this region this risk is managed in part through a special reward arrangement with CS (see Table 2 ). Significantly, a CS regional construction association partner notes:
. . . in the past few years, an increase in heavy equipment theft. This increase has been so dramatic that some contractors are having difficulty finding insurance. . . . The [name of partner] has also joined with Crime Stoppers, producing decals for member contractors to put on equipment, and signs to post at project sites. (OSWCA, 2001, emphasis added) The emphasis of Crimes of the Week on property loss more broadly suggests involvement of private insurance in CS. Crimes against businesses, Promotion of property crime in Crimes of the Week therefore indirectly benefits private insurance. According to interviewees, after coordinators screen tips they are often sent to both police and partners. In some instances CS identifies risk by collecting and sending the tip and the insurance partner then manages risk, without police pursuing it through criminal law, by for example denying an insurance claim (Interview 10). These tips about insurance fraud promise to benefit private insurance directly to the extent that a reduction of fraud is realized. The CCIF newsletter regularly reports the results of this arrangement to the larger insurance industry that funds it, not using the CS format of total number of arrests and value of goods and drugs recovered due to tips, but significantly in its own terms of absolute numbers of arrests and claims denied due to tips received to date from CS that pertained to insurance fraud. The CCIF is for this reason not a distant sponsor hoping for a somewhat intangible symbolic benefit involving 'giving the industry a community look' (Interview 10). Through its new intimate, active arrangement with CS that takes the now pervasive partnership form preferred in advanced liberalism, CCIF is also pursuing practical goals.
GOVERNING AND DEPLOYING ANONYMITY
Governance requires knowledge of the governed (Rose and Miller, 1992) . Rendering a person or place anonymous, or 'anonymization', is a technique of governance that promises to camouflage identity of subjects, effectively distancing them from those who seek to govern. But subjects are not relocated so far away that they cannot be known.
From its birth, anonymity has been the lynchpin of CS. Without it the programme collapses like a house of cards. A local board member noted:
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the number one fear is . . . having one of your tipsters identified, because once that happens, you can kiss the whole programme goodbye . . . as soon as it comes out it becomes public knowledge that they can't guarantee your anonymity. Nobody's going to call you. . .
. (Interview 1)
Anonymity is in point of fact only 'one polar value of a broad dimension of identifiability versus nonidentifiability' (Marx, 1999 : 100) and as such not easily achieved. Marx (1999: 100-2) describes several types of 'identity knowledge' that must remain unknown to achieve full anonymity. CS attempts to render only legal name, 'locatability' and potential pseudonyms of tipsterssome of these types -unknown. CS coordinators would come to acquire identity knowledge about tipster gender, age, class, ethnicity and linguistic features (gleaned from the tipster's voice on the telephone), as well as his/her pattern of being at particular locations at specific times of day (derived from circumstances surrounding their call and tip). These are what Marx (1999: 100) refers to as 'social categorization' and 'pattern knowledge' respectively. However, according to the demands of CS reward determination discussed later, coordinators are also required to know at a minimum whether the tipster is a repeat caller, how much risk is taken to obtain the tip, and the categorical numerical code assigned to every tipster the first time he/she calls. The last of these is a 'symbol of eligibility' (Marx, 1999 : 100) that identifies the caller at a later time as someone eligible to receive rewards. Anonymization in CS, therefore, involves elimination of a name and some forms of identity knowledge, but the tipster is still known in some manner. Without this knowledge CS would cease to function. Rendering even some forms of identity knowledge unknowable nonetheless requires considerable vigilance and special techniques. Toward this end, coordinators claimed to screen tips that are obviously not anonymous:
If a tip comes in and I can figure out who the caller is, then it won't get sent anywhere and we'll just tell the caller say like, 'I know you're the guy's sisterin-law'. . . . We're not sending that along because there's no anonymity there. But if it's a clean tip . . . then it's forwarded out of this office. (Interview 4) The standard tip sheet produced by tips software from one programme states at the bottom of every page: 'THIS REPORT IS NOT TO BE COPIED OR ATTACHED TO ANY POLICE FILE. This document is PROPERTY of [name of local programme] Crime Stoppers'. As CS property, the tip sheet is to be returned to CS upon completion of an investigation. In another programme an interviewee related that the sheet is printed on special paper to prevent photocopying and observed:
we don't want that information that's on the tip sheet to go out because it may have information, again, that might lead the perpetrator to identify who called in. . . . We want to make sure that stuff doesn't stay out there, [that] it comes back to us and it's under our lock and key. (Interview 1) In some instances a tip is not even provided in textual form: '[W]hen we are dealing with organizations we don't deal with generally, then we may give LIPPERT: CRIME STOPPERS REVISITED 489 the information verbally . . . -we don't want one of the tips to end up in a court brief somewhere' (Interview 4). In another programme when a tip is sent to a police service with whom there is less familiarity, a copy of a court ruling on anonymity discussed later is attached as a less than subtle reminder of the prime directive. As well, a tip is sent out with instructions to return it or inform CS of its fate after limited time has elapsed. Significantly, the anonymity of these tips is represented in moral terms. As mentioned earlier, a tip that is anonymous is 'clean'. A 'dirty' tip would therefore be one that 'gives too much that would identify the caller and sometimes we can clean those up so they don't' (Interview 4). Another coordinator related what is appropriately done with a permanently 'dirty' tip: 'We will throw it in the garbage on a case rather than breach the anonymity of an informant . . .' (Interview 3). The issue of 'funnelling' arose in the early development of CS (Carriere and Ericson, 1989: 27-8) and entailed police suggesting to a registered or other informant, to call their tip into CS to seek a monetary reward. But because police already know their identity, anonymity would be compromised (Carriere, 1987) . In effect, the regular informant known to police is sent down a road where only the amateur tipster ought to tread. This onramp had to be barricaded through subsequent inclusion of funnelling as a regular subject of the CS Manual, training videos and annual training sessions (e.g. Crime Stoppers, 2001c: 3.7). 5 Interviewees noted that over the last decade the proliferation of a wide array of new communication technologies 6 including 'call display', 'call memory' or 'redial' functions, cell telephones and e-mail have threatened anonymity and therefore required special attention. For example, CS had to advertise widely -including in Crimes of the Week -that they do not subscribe to 'call display'. Coordinators instruct tipsters once they call to erase their call memory so the last number dialled cannot be discovered or to immediately switch to a landline if using a cellphone. It is also now advertised on CS websites that tips are never to be sent via e-mail because they include an address that could identify the tipster.
Recognizing this centrality of anonymity helps reveal the complex relationship between CS and law (cf. Carriere and Ericson, 1989: 27-9) . In R. v. Kyryluk it was ruled that evidence from a search warrant granted as a result of a CS tip was contrary to section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which pertains to excluding evidence that would 'bring the administration of justice into disrepute'. Therefore, CS tips are insufficient in themselves to obtain search warrants. More recently a search warrant obtained by police that had stemmed from their observations that had been encouraged by a CS tip was successfully challenged. In this case the judge had ordered the Crown to disclose details of how police were granted the search warrant, including the CS tip sheet, consistent with the Charter, and sought to edit the sheet by removing information that he deemed to reveal the identity of the tipster. After ordering disclosure the Crown claimed informer privilege and refused to provide the edited sheet to the defence, a Unlike regular police informants, the information that might identify an anonymous CS tipster is unknown and therefore in this instance any information on the CS tip sheet might have revealed his or her identity (the judge and Crown could not have known what could or could not be revealed to the accused). As well, waiving informer privilege requires consent of the informer which is difficult to obtain because it is dependent on subsequent tipster-initiated contact with CS. As a result of this decision, the Crown is no longer required to reveal any information supplied by CS tipsters, not even edited tip sheets, due to the possibility of identifying the tipster, though still subject to the 'innocence at stake' exception. 7 CS programmes contributed funds to actively defend against this court challenge and one served as intervener. An international CS board member related:
if any one Crime Stopper programme falls due to some technicality, regardless of where it happens or wrongdoing, then the whole thing can come tumbling down. So it's to our benefit to make sure that wherever there's a legal challenge that it's fought on all levels. (Interview 7)
Indeed, a major function of CS International is to provide legal assistance and legal issues training for local programmes (Crime Stoppers, 2001b: 104) . Therefore in addition to aiding law enforcement in CS, anonymity is governed through law. 8 This significant legal victory has undoubtedly been a condition of possibility for the continued expansion of CS in Canada. Carriere and Ericson (1989: 99) noted there is less accountability to the public in CS due to reliance on corporate funding. Making the private partnerships feasible presupposes CS maintaining charitable status. Yet an examination of their registered charity status returns suggests that CS programmes are legally required to provide only minimal information to maintain this status annually -there is indeed little accountability. But accountability issues are also linked to governing anonymity. Ensuring anonymity is a CS rationale for rejecting regular public funding: 'If we became government operated by any means, then we'd be open to freedom of information legislation . . . which would really screw up the anonymity portion' (Interview 5). Greater public accountability usually accompanies traditional funding drawn from the state treasury and administered by a bureaucracy operating under a political authority, but so does a greater likelihood that forms of identity knowledge would appear in these accounts (especially since it is unclear what might identify a tipster). This would potentially jeopardize anonymity and by implication CS. Appearance of freedom of information legislation therefore has been a condition of possibility of increased reliance on private partnerships and CS LIPPERT: CRIME STOPPERS REVISITED 491 growth in that direction. At the same time despite consistent claims by CS to the contrary (cf. Carriere and Ericson, 1989: 98) , CS remains at least partially publicly funded. This is seen in the funding from public police services for office space, operations manuals and coordinators' salaries mentioned earlier.
In addition, according to charity returns, some programmes have also commenced drawing on a new special 'public' fund introduced by the regional government and generated from casino gaming revenues in the region. As well, the after-hours answering service for tips for the region that has dramatically increased the temporal scope of CS since its introduction in 1998 is funded by a 'public' operating grant from the regional government through a programme generated by recovered 'proceeds of crime' (Bragg, 1998) . Both of these forms of 'public' funding undoubtedly require less accountability from CS than that drawn directly from general state revenues. Consistent with the reduction of moral risk to police through deployment of anonymity in CS, mentioned later, use of this new targeted 'public' funding which is of a morally contentious nature due to its sources (gambling and crime respectively) is not advertised by CS beyond what is required by law. Anonymity promises to reduce CS tipsters' fear, but it also seeks to protect police from moral spoilage in a way that mere confidentiality used with more traditional registered police informant arrangements cannot. Confidentiality presumes trustworthiness; anonymity presumes untrustworthiness. Because of increasing association with wrongful conviction of innocents across Canada during the 1990s (e.g. McLean-Candis, 2000) , the 'jail-house' informant has been problematized and the registered informant, illustrated by a recent police scandal in Canada's largest city (Quinn, 2001 ), continues to show considerable potential for moral contamination of police. Indeed, problematization along these lines has been another condition of possibility for the expansion of CS. Unlike these informants that require risk profiling to weed out 'treacherous sources' among them (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 255) , anonymization undertakes to protect police from this moral risk. CS coordinators may have been morally tainted through direct, albeit brief, transactions with the criminal element, but no one knows for certain. Nor is it ever clear to casual observers whether CS coordinators are in fact police. Therefore in CS, anonymization seeks to 'demoralize' the relationship between police (and their new partners) and criminal subcultures in the course of identifying and managing risk. If anonymity is maintained, the need for elaborate witness protection programmes is avoided. It also reduces risk of civil lawsuits launched by victims of police informants who can claim that police had knowledge of the criminal intentions of an informant and for that reason should have sought to prevent the informant's commission of an offence (e.g. Abbate, 2002) .
REWARDS, RISK AND TIPSTERS
Given an attention to risk in CS, how are rewards to be understood? 'Ward' means to protect against as in 'ward off'. In CS it is primarily property loss 492
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that is to be 'warded off'. In CS the posting of a monetary reward of specified value for information about a specific criminal act is rare. Rather, a standing reward that varies in value from CDN$50 to CDN$1000 depending on the board's decision is offered, the upper level being vigilantly policed by the regional CS board to maintain uniformity across programmes so as to avoid competition for tipsters. These monetary 'rewards' from the perspective of CS boards and coordinators target specific tipsters' past efforts that eventually led to arrest or recovery of stolen property or illegal drugs, but this does not necessarily mean that tips themselves are oriented to the past. Coordinators related that many are not. A further sign of an emphasis on managing risk through rewards and a means of governing their use across CS programmes is a new graduated point system used in some programmes to determine reward levels (Crime Stoppers, 2001c: 2.9). If an arrest is made as a consequence of a tip, the CS board is to take account of the number and severity of the charges it generated, or with recovery of illicit property or drugs, their estimated value. Points are assigned for each. The reward decision is clearly not about management of risk posed by the individual perpetrator arrested due to a tip, but instead that posed by the number and types of crimes to which the tip pertained. In these ways, CS represents a shift away from the traditional longstanding practice of posting a reward by authorities (e.g. Traub, 1988) in an ad hoc, arbitrarily fixed manner for an undifferentiated public, toward a continuous rationalized programme that assumes more specific though limited knowledge of tipsters.
CS coordinators send a short summary of the details of a case for reimbursement to designated partner representatives, often the head of security for the association or organization, who then decides whether to reimburse CS. From most partners' perspectives such an arrest or recovery by police is less an end in itself and more a means of measuring whether CS is successfully promoting their type of crime to generate tips consistent with the partnership. In the view of partners who reimburse CS according to their own specific classification schemes or consistent with CS board decisions (see Table 2 ), monetary rewards are part of an association with CS that imagines 'warding off' property loss in the future. That is to say, offering and granting monetary rewards is about managing and spreading risk on behalf of not only police, but increasingly also of partners.
Significantly, examination of one programme's reward point system provided by an interviewee includes besides the aspects above, 'risk to caller' and 'repeat caller' as factors to be considered. The 1983 Manual makes no mention of a point system such as this, but it similarly states that 'cooperation given and risk taken by the informant, [and] whether he or she is a frequent caller' should be considered in decisions (Crime Stoppers, 1983: III-13) . The 2001 Manual recognizes both practices. To be sure, some programmes in the region (still) rely on the discretion of the CS coordinator to make a recommendation to the board. Yet in these instances the Manual also encourages the board to The tipster that takes more risk is to be rewarded accordingly. Being a repeat tipster, that is, continually patrolling for certain kinds of risky situations or persons, is also encouraged through rewards. An important consequence of these reward arrangements, however, is that information has to flow both ways in CS. Tips come in and are routed to appropriate police investigators and partners, but it is essential that the fate of the tip be gleaned and relayed to the tipster when he/she calls back to inquire and to otherwise determine appropriate rewards. A coordinator related regarding a police service within his programme's purview, but which was not (as) closely associated with CS: 'All we ask is that . . . when we send them information that they get back to us so the caller doesn't think we're screwing them around' (Interview 3). For this reason, and not unlike freedom of information legislation, privacy legislation has been a barrier to CS. Such legislation prevents, for example, the federal government tax agency and other government departments with regulatory branches from releasing information about investigations of individuals commenced on the basis of CS tips and therefore from forming partnerships with CS. A coordinator noted:
And we don't take tips [for] . . . Revenue Canada. And the reason we don't is . . . their guidelines . . . Like we had one [tip] for instance that the fellow was running shadow employees. We passed it on . . . and Revenue Canada said: 'Well we're sorry we can't tell you anything about that'. So when the caller phones back they say, 'how's my case coming'? You know, 'is it coming along well'? We don't know. So then the caller who's spent the time calling us and giving all this information, we don't get any feedback on what [happened with] the case, [and] they think that we're beating them for the reward. You've solved it, or I spent all this time, and now you're telling me you can't tell me anything. So we have no way to base the reward on . . . (Interview 3) One programme found a way around this. Its CS coordinator related:
[to] a lot of the government agencies . . . [we say] 'we don't know what you did with this person, we just want to know if you're happy'. So they'll call us up and say 'we're happy with what you told us'. So we pay the caller on that basis. We don't need to know that they got charged, [or] they got this much money back . . . (Interview 4) In this programme a fixed, token monetary reward was paid for 'happy' tips. Nevertheless, this suggests that law can at times also serve as somewhat of a barrier to CS.
Inseparable from promotions, anonymization and rewards are imaginings of the tipster. The central target of all three is the fearful, apathetic citizen. This is clearly evinced in CS discourse instantiated in websites and Crimes
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SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 11(4) of the Week advertisements. It is the tipster who is deemed potentially malleable in CS discourse, not the criminal, though the two entities sometimes overlap. As noted earlier, Crimes of the Week and most obviously those that are generic encourage citizens to become more vigilant in relation to particular kinds of crime. They do not discriminate among types of tipsters. In CS, tipsters' fear is to be alleviated through anonymization and apathy transformed into risk taking through promise of reward. As a coordinator observed:
. . . people just are doing it because they want to get involved but they don't want to have to go to court. They don't want, you know, the fear, the apathy there, the apathy is overcome by offering them the cash. But in the long run most people don't want the money . . . (Interview 2) In CS discourse 'tipster' and 'caller' (like 'whistle blower' in other contexts) largely replace the neutral 'informant' and 'informer' (Ericson, 1993) and morally spoiled 'narc', 'rat', 'fink', 'snoop', 'stoolie' and 'snitch' identities that connote a breach of trust. Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 267) note that in what they call 'risk society', '. . . informing is promoted not only as legitimate but also as an act of good citizenship' (original emphasis). However, within CS reward determinations a positive image such as this is associated with only one kind of tipster. From the outset CS has imagined at least two types in granting rewards, 'the "Good Citizen" '. . . and criminals themselves' (Crime Stoppers, 1983: IV-7). As seen in the quotation above that 'most people don't want the money', the 'good citizen' tipster is deemed to be more prevalent (e.g. Reimer, 1984) and in one CS Manual claimed to comprise 'about 55 percent' of all tipsters (Crime Stoppers, 1983: IV-7). As well, these tipsters 'aren't usually motivated by cash rewards' (Crime Stoppers, 1983: IV-7). Similarly, a local board member related that 'about sixty six percent don't bother collecting their money. . . . They just want to do something about it' (Interview 1). Evidence of the greater prevalence of the 'good citizen' tipster is based on dubious 'pattern knowledge' that suggests that a large proportion of monetary rewards are not retrieved (a situation that could be due to a variety of reasons other than good citizenship such as an inadequate reward for the effort required to retrieve it or fear of being identified). These claims are efforts to suggest that offering monetary rewards does not corrupt the sense of civic duty in the community and to otherwise prevent moral spoilage of police. In CS texts and talk concerning rewards, the 'good citizen' is associated with fear and assumed to be in pursuit of only moral rewards -learning from the CS coordinator what came of their information investment is return enough. The 'criminal' tipster, on the other hand, is associated with the pursuit of monetary rewards and revenge. A coordinator related:
. . . the people that call and actually collect the money are usually of the criminal element. And . . . if you were that inclined to be a criminal, this is a great way because you're out there with the bad people, you know what they're doing . . . (Interview 2) LIPPERT: CRIME STOPPERS REVISITED 495
Similarly, a CS board member observed that CS . . . provides anonymity which most people have as a number one concern . . . for those people who may not be concerned about that, but are of the mindset of those criminals who may have gotten money through other means before, it provides them with some monetary incentive to call. (Interview 7) The 'criminal' tipster is also consistently associated with revenge. For example, another coordinator noted:
Well, you don't know anything about the drug culture if you're not involved in the drug culture. They may be sellers themselves. I had a call one time where . . . he said: 'Do you take tips from drug dealers about other drug dealers?' We don't care. We'll take tips from anybody . . . knowing sooner or later he's going to get his too. (Interview 4) In CS the knowledge produced during interactions between coordinators and tipsters and then used in reward determinations permits such moral classifications. The imagined 'criminal' tipster is deemed morally inferior, calling in tips due to the basest of inspirations and it is association with this type from which anonymization seeks to prevent police from becoming morally tainted.
CONCLUSION
This account complements but ultimately moves beyond the approach and findings of Carriere and Ericson's (1989) case study and other previous research on CS. Rather than promoting deterrence, incapacitation, and a broader 'law and order' ideology primarily through depictions of violent crime committed by strangers in public streets, this account suggests Crime of the Week advertisements promote an attention to risk of property loss, including that which faces new CS partners such as private insurance. The growth and changing character of CS since the 1980s along these lines are due to disparate conditions of possibility including but not limited to a problematization of police informants and insurance fraud; a significant Supreme Court of Canada decision; and introduction of freedom of information and privacy legislation. CS is consistent with and lends insight into arrangements of rule referred to as 'advanced' liberal. The rise of regional and federal CS partnerships, exemplified by private insurance, which entail new reward criteria and risk management requirements, suggests an increasing abandonment of efforts to govern through society for the public good. CS is more concerned with risk to property, often to the practical benefit of partners. Partners are concerned primarily with reducing risk associated with their kind of crime and whether CS is pursuing this aim. Toward this end, CS targets the tipster in promotions 496 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 11(4) rather than the criminal or causal factors leading to criminal behaviour. On the surface this is a remarkable omission for a programme that claims to 'stop crime'. Yet this neglect is consistent with crime prevention through environmental design and related programmes that elicit a disinterest in the psychological and social causes of crime and which fit advanced liberal forms of risk management and 'government at a distance' more generally (O'Malley, 1992; Simon, 1994) . Anonymity, a key feature of CS, reduces risk to tipsters and police. It is fundamentally social only in the sense of presupposing an audience of at least one other (Marx, 1999) : it does not presume governing through 'the social' (Rose, 1996) . In manufacturing social distance as it is itself manufactured, anonymity is a technique that is more consonant with advanced liberal arrangements (Rose, 1996) . Offers of rewards in CS similarly promise to serve as the benefit side of cost-benefit calculations that the risk-taking subjects of such a rationality of rule are imagined contemplating prior to every action (Rose, 1992) . Along with promotions, these are neglected techniques of governance that can be found in other domains. 9 In CS they are deployed in a unique manner, one pointing out tipsters' targets, one seeking to reduce tipsters' risk, another encouraging it. But when deployed together problems can emerge. If there is poor promotion of anonymity, rewards and types of crime about which to pursue tips, the citizen remains at home in a state of apathy or fear. If there is complete anonymization in CS, and therefore no identity knowledge generated about the tipster, reward determination becomes impossible. If there is too much reward granted, such that the community takes notice of a tipster's new riches, anonymization becomes so. Techniques such as this that permit risk management and 'government at a distance' therefore are not self-evident as previous research implies, but are instead incomplete and contested and have to be governed in various ways as they are simultaneously deployed. Law is a way in which governance of these techniques is accomplished in advanced liberalism, but due to the peculiar configuration of CS, it can also serve as a barrier to their deployment and growth that then demands to be managed or avoided in turn (e.g. through pursuit of private partnerships).
Despite an emphasis on risk, this account also reveals moral aspects in the operations of CS. Anonymization, for example, seeks not only to promote tips about property crime by reducing risk, but also to demoralize police (and partners') relationships with tipsters. Other such efforts range from screening potential CS partners for moral risks, to downplaying morally contentious funding sources, to creating and displaying moral categories such as the 'good citizen' tipster. Consistent with other recent research findings, CS suggests an attention to risk in advanced liberal governance is intertwined with moral discourse. This discourse stems from the 'responsibilization' of citizens and private partners and a concomitant 'de-responsibilization' of public authorities that advanced liberalism and 'government at a distance' imagine (cf. Lippert, 1998) and the way the techniques of governance that LIPPERT: CRIME STOPPERS REVISITED 497 4.
These two programmes operate in large urban areas, one of which was likely originally studied by Carriere and Ericson (1989) . Due to their large populations, coordinators may have had a higher number of violent events from which to transform into Crimes of the Week. According to interviewees, there is competition between these two programmes for media outlets' attention, which might also have contributed to this emphasis. Stress on violent crime and affective discourse that Carriere and Ericson (1989) discovered, therefore, might have been more a function of the peculiarities of the programme studied than a general feature of CS. 5.
It was recently discovered by three media outlets affiliated with one Canadian CS programme that police had carried out a new kind of 'funnelling'. They had filtered an entirely fabricated Break and Enter case through CS as a Crime of the Week in 1998 as part of an elaborate sting operation to set up a police informant as a business person who had accumulated a lot of wealth through criminal activity (Monteiro, 2002) . Upon discovery these outlets immediately ceased to advertise Crimes of the Week on behalf of CS. Since the story received considerable regional and federal media coverage, implying this practice could be widespread, a regional level of CS sought to stem the moral contamination of CS and media partners from direct connections with regular police informants and false information in part by stepping up policing of the selection of Crimes of the Week (Monteiro, 2002) . 6.
Technological development, like law, is not always a barrier to CS. To render the new regional after-hours answering service feasible, programmes in the region required similar communication formats. This was made possible by standardization devices such as tips software that presuppose such arrangements (Tipsoft, 2002) . This software has helped provide a template for lowpaid, inexperienced answering service workers to screen tips while maintaining anonymity, automatically to assign a tipster a number, and to coordinate and speed up transmission of tips. That tips are not exclusively sent to police is a notion also built into their architecture. Their other function is to provide coordinators with quicker access to information about the stage or outcome of an investigation resulting from a tip so it can be relayed to the inquiring tipster who made the initial moral investment. 7.
For the 'innocence at stake' exception to be used, evidence must be present that establishes that revealing the identity of the informer is required to demonstrate the innocence of the accused. 8.
Promotional efforts are also governed through law. Given the considerable effort put into CS promotions described earlier it is not surprising that when a private security firm appeared on the scene in the 1980s sporting a name similar to CS, a local programme filed suit. It was subsequently successfully argued in Toronto and Regional Crime Stoppers Inc. v. Crimestoppers Security Systems that it was in the public interest to legally force the firm to change its name. In light of the appearance of recent private CS partnerships in the 1990s that continue to grow in number, one wonders whether such an argument would be successful in the courts today. 9.
Promotions are ubiquitous; anonymization seeks to demoralize social relationships in domains as varied as Alcoholics Anonymous programmes (Valverde and White-Mair, 1999) , research programmes involving human subjects, and Internet communications; and offering graduated rewards for performance has been installed in an array of institutions, effectively displacing arrangements based on trust.
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